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Summary
This report reviews steel industry issues facing Congress,  including:
! President Bush’s Section 201 steel trade case decision;
! The international response;
! Legacy costs and industry consolidation;
! Legislative proposals concerning the steel industry.
For more detail, see CRS Report RL31107, Steel Industry and Trade Issues and
CRS Report RL31279, Steel: Legacy Cost Issue.
The Section 201 Trade Case
Presidential Request.  To address the question of imports, and in response to
many requests from Congress, union representatives and steel companies, President Bush
on June 5, 2001, announced that his Administration would call upon the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) to begin an investigation under Section 201 of
U.S. trade law. He also announced that he would seek multilateral negotiations with U.S.
trading partners on fundamental issues of overcapacity and subsidies.1  On March 5, 2002,
at the end of the Section 201 process, the President announced a series of temporary trade
relief measures to safeguard the U.S. steel industry against injury from imports.2  The steel
industry had already received limited import relief under Section 201 safeguard actions
undertaken by the Clinton Administration in 1999-2000 regarding steel wire rod and line
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pipe products.  But the Bush Administration request was on a broader basis, covering
more than 500 tariff line items, grouped by an ITC staff report into 33 products and four
broad groups:
! carbon and alloy flat products, including semifinished steel slabs, but not
upstream inputs, such as iron ore, pig iron and coke;
! carbon and alloy long products;
! carbon and alloy pipe and tube products; and 
! stainless and tool steel products. 
Injury Phase.  The ITC must find that imports are a  “substantial” cause of serious
injury (i.e., “important and not less than any other cause”) in order to propose relief under
Section 201.  On October 22, 2001, the ITC determined that in 16 cases imports were a
substantial cause of injury to the domestic industry, which covered three-quarters of all
U.S. steel imports.  In the other 17 product categories, the ITC found no substantial injury
from imports, and dismissed them from further consideration.  These products included
stainless and carbon steel wire, rope and nails, and oil country tubular goods. 
Remedy Phase.  The ITC conducted hearings on possible trade remedies in
November 2001.  In general, the petitioners, representing especially U.S. integrated steel
mills, minimills, and the United Steelworkers union (USWA) asked for high levels of
protective tariffs, at the 40 to 50% level.  Respondents, representing importers, mills that
use imported steel in various stages of processing, and steel-consuming industries, in
general expressed a preference for a solution based on quotas that would allow continued
importation at historic levels without assessment of additional tariff charges.  The ITC
remedy recommendations were varied.  All commissioners recommended relief for the
maximum period, four years, with the highest remedy tariff levels ranging from 20% to
40% for semi-finished and most flat products.  All of the six commissioners
recommended a tariff-rate quota for semi-finished steel slabs. On the lower volume, but
higher cost, tubular, stainless and tool steel products, the recommendations were generally
for lower levels of remedy tariff relief.   One commissioner essentially abjured remedy
tariffs altogether and instead recommended import quotas across the board.3
Presidential Decision.  Acting within the period prescribed by law, President
Bush announced trade remedies for all products on which the ITC had found substantial
injury, except for two specialty categories (tool steel and stainless steel flanges and
fittings).  All remedies will be of three years duration and were imposed as of March 20,
2002.  The President will also impose a general import licensing and monitoring system.
! For the high-volume flat, bar and tin mill products, the President imposed
a remedy tariff of 30% for the first year, reduced to 24% in the second
year and 18% in the third year.
! For semi-finished steel slabs the President established the same levels of
tariff remedy, with a quota of 5.4 million tons, on which no remedy
tariffs will be applied.
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! For other products, the President set the following levels of remedy tariff
protection: for rebar, welded tubular steel, stainless rod and stainless bar,
the remedy tariff is 15% for the first year, then declines by 3% per year;
for carbon and alloy steel flanges and fittings the remedy relief is 13% in
the first year, then declines by 3% per year; and for stainless steel wire
the remedy relief is 8%, declining by 1% per year for the subsequent two
years.4
Exemptions and Exclusions.  Imports from the North American and other Free
Trade Areas are excluded from the presidential order, meaning products of Canada and
Mexico (significant exporters of steel products to the U.S. market), and from Israel and
Jordan.  Semi-finished slabs from these countries (Mexico is a major supplier) are
excluded from the tariff-rate quota, accordingly reduced from the level recommended by
the ITC.5 Also exempted, with some exceptions, are imports from developing countries
that are World Trade Organization (WTO) members and eligible for tariff-free treatment
under the Generalized System of Preferences.  Exceptions to this exclusion are when such
developing country products are a significant share of U.S. imports.  The President also
retains the discretion to impose safeguard measures on products from developing
countries, should they surge during the relief period.  China, Russia and the Ukraine are
not included in the developing country exemption.6  Specific products may also be
excluded on a case-by-case basis, particularly when it can be shown that domestically
produced substitute products are not readily available.  The President will make final
decisions on specific product exemptions by July 3, 2002.  More than 200 product
requests have already been granted, as listed in the Annex to the presidential proclamation
and in a supplemental list.7  Details on further consideration of exclusion requests and on
how to file new requests are on the U.S. Trade Representative’s website.
An opponent of Section 201 remedy tariffs, Representative William Jefferson,
introduced a resolution of disapproval, H.J.Res. 84, as provided under the 1974 Trade
Act.  The resolution would substitute for the presidential determination the lower tariff
levels that represented the official recommendation of the ITC.  On April 24, the House
Ways and Means Committee voted to report H.J.Res. 84 unfavorably and on May 8, 2002,
it was tabled in two procedural votes on the House floor.8  
International Reaction and Response
The Section 201 case is but one prong of the Bush Administration global steel
policy.  The Administration has also initiated international negotiations on global capacity
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reduction and improved trade discipline in the steel industry.  The President’s Section 201
remedy decision has created considerable concern among some U.S. trading partners,
including steps to challenge U.S. actions before the WTO.
The European Union (EU) has reacted most aggressively so far to the Section 201
decision on steel.  It has forwarded  two separate requests for consultation under WTO
rules.  The European Commission states that the EU could impose retaliatory tariffs
almost immediately if it receives no U.S. compensation without awaiting any WTO ruling
on the validity of safeguard measures, because the Bush Administration’s Section 201
actions were not in accordance with the WTO Safeguards Agreement. The EU has also
announced its own safeguards against diversion of steel from the United States.  Among
other countries, Japan, Australia, and South Korea have filed requests for consultations
under WTO Safeguard Agreement rules, although Australia and Korea have gained
exemptions for major product exports.9  Brazil, with significant exports covered by the
Section 201 decision, but other products exempted, has not taken action under the WTO.
But the foreign minister has warned that the U.S. policy could impact other trade
negotiations.10  Canada has supported the U.S. Section 201 policy, although it is
considering safeguards against any diversion of steel from the U.S. market.11  Mexico,
which set a 25% safeguard tariff on non-NAFTA steel imports, will raise it to 35%.
Meanwhile, multilateral discussions in the steel committee of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have produced promised global
capacity reductions of about 120 million metric tons (MT) by 2005.  This total includes
roughly equal U.S. and EU projections of 15-20 million MT of reductions.  So far, the
talks are continuing, despite the U.S. Section 201 actions.12
Legacy Costs and Steel Industry Consolidation
Legacy costs may be defined as pension and health care provisions of steel worker
contracts that are funded by earnings of steel companies.  These benefits were negotiated
at unionized integrated steel companies to encourage workers to accept downsizing and
productivity improvements necessary to keep these companies competitive.  Now many
of these companies are in bankruptcy and facing liquidation, leaving retirees facing loss
of benefits.  A number of legislative proposals have been made to address this issue; a
major question is whether responsibility for benefits deals negotiated by private parties
should be transferred to the U.S. government.
The USWA calculates that total unfunded liabilities may be $13 billion and USWA
president Leo Gerard estimated the  number of affected retirees at 600,000 in a letter to
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Members of Congress dated January 15, 2002.13  They argue that the major integrated
companies are at a competitive disadvantage against many steel minimills, which do not
face legacy costs, or foreign manufacturers whose governments cover all steelworkers
through national health care plans.14  Retirees and active employees of a company
providing health care could lose all coverage, if the employer ends the plan upon a
liquidation under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy law.  Or retiree health coverage may be
subject to modification or termination in a bankruptcy reorganization.15
The U.S. Steel Corporation has proposed a comprehensive plan for consolidating
much of the integrated steel industry, but it would require a resolution of the legacy cost
problem through some form of government involvement.  The minimills have opposed
direct legacy cost aid and support only a very limited form of legacy cost relief, with no
direct government payments or subsidies to operating steel companies.16  Gerard indicated
labor’s support for the U.S. Steel plan and government aid in covering legacy costs.17  The
Bush Administration has not supported legacy cost relief, emphasizing that Members of
Congress urged it to focus on Section 201 trade relief as its initial step.18 
Legislative Proposals
Congress has considered measures providing the steel industry relief from imports,
as well as providing direct and indirect support to the domestic industry. Some of these
measures became law in the 106th Congress; others await further action in the 107th
Congress. 
Implementation of the 2000 Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act.  Under this
law penalty import duties are being distributed among successful petitioners (“Byrd
Amendment” in P.L. 106-387). More than $200 million has been distributed so far, about
half to steel companies.  However, this law is under challenge by 11 U.S. trading partners
in the WTO.  A decision is expected in July 2002.
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Amendment of  the Emergency Steel Loan Guarantee Program (P.L. 106-51).  It was
passed in 1999, but only one company has been able to use a guarantee to obtain a loan.
An amendment to the FY 2002 Interior appropriations law (P.L. 107-63) made conditions
easier for obtaining loan guarantees, primarily by extending the repayment deadline to
2015.  In view of LTV’s failure to obtain a loan guarantee and its subsequent liquidation,
legislation has been introduced in the 107th Congress to ease these conditions further
(H.R. 3428 and S. 1884/H.R. 3559).
Steel Revitalization Act (H.R. 808/S.957).  This comprehensive relief bill includes
mandatory five-year import or other trade restraints, a steel sales tax to pay for industry
legacy costs, and other industry relief measures.  The bill has gained 228 House co-
sponsors and a discharge petition has gained 123 signatures out of the 218 required to
bring the bill to the House floor.  President Bush’s Section 201 remedies appear to have
rendered the trade provisions of this bill moot.
Steel Industry Legacy Cost Bills (S. 2189, H.R. 4574, H.R. 4646).  Sens. Rockefeller
and Specter introduced a Senate bill in April 2002.  It would provide federal health care
coverage for steel industry retirees who lose their private coverage through an industry
bankruptcy. It would also encourage industry consolidation by allowing acquiring steel
companies to shift responsibility for acquired companies’ retirees to the new federal
program.  The program would be financed by Section 201 tariffs, current health care
assets and premiums, a $5 per ton tax on assets of acquired operations, and further
appropriations as necessary.  Senator Stevens attempted to add an earlier version of this
bill to the Senate energy package, with funding also from Alaska oil royalties, but was
defeated in a floor cloture vote.  House bills with similar goals and approaches to S. 2189
are H.R. 4574 and H.R. 4646.
Trade Adjustment Assistance Act (TAA) reauthorization.  TAA provides assistance
to workers who have lost their jobs because of competition from imports.  Authorization
of the program expired at the end of 2001.  Legislation has been introduced in both
Houses to provide program enhancements that would address some legacy cost issues
(H.R. 3008 and S.1209/H.R. 3670).19  The Senate Majority Leader, Sen. Daschle,
introduced an amendment to add TAA reform provisions to trade legislation being
considered by the Senate (H.R. 3009) and included retiree steelworkers among those
eligible for federal coverage of most of their health care costs, under certain conditions.
After strong opposition from Republican senators and the Bush Administration to this
latter provision, the steel retirees’ provision was dropped in a compromise substitute bill
proposed by the chair and ranking member of the Finance Committee, Sens. Baucus and
Grassley.  An amendment to restore  retired steelworkers’ lost health care coverage on a
subsidized basis for one year did not receive enough votes to close debate on May 21,
2002.20 
